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I. When it comes to motivating employees, altruism in employer-employee relationships 
favors the use of a carrot whereas spite favors the use of a stick.     (Chapter 2) 
 
II. In employer-employee relationships, a marginal increase in altruism may make both 
players worse off.           (Chapter 2) 
 
III. Supervisor’s altruism toward a subordinate can be useful in motivating the supervisor 
to report the subordinate’s performance truthfully.      (Chapter 3) 
 
IV. Even though top managers and lower-level employees rarely interact directly, top 
managers work very hard in order to motivate lower-level employees.      (Chapter 4) 
 
V. Less hierarchy in an organization fosters the cultivation of effort norms for employees.
                                 (Chapter 4) 
 
 
VI. Relational contract models generally build on the assumption that players follow a 
trigger strategy that prescribes to punish players who deviate from the contract. To 
properly found this assumption, one needs to invoke the notion of social preferences. 
 
VII. A good economist has a strong intuition for what is in a player’s utility function. 
 
VIII. The difference between theoretical and empirical research is overstated: both are 
means to explore unanswered questions. 
 
IX. If one had to choose, one should choose to be altruistic rather than conformist. 
 
X. By nature of the enterprise, it is hard to tell beforehand whether research will be 
successful. Scientists are therefore likely to be risk-tolerant or even risk-loving people. 
 
 
XI. The optimal share of surprising results of a theoretical analysis lies around 50 percent. 
